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Abstract
We model a successive-generation economy in which parents, motivated by fam-
ily altruism, decide to finance or not their offspring’s capital accumulation on
the basis of their altruistic motive, their own income and the equilibrium ratio
between skilled-labor and unskilled-labor wages. The question we ask is how
the growth process in this economy shapes the wage inequality and the split of
the population in two classes. We study the transitional dynamics of human
capital accumulation and of wage inequality. First, we prove the existence of
equilibrium paths. Then we show that there exists a continuum of steady-state
equilibria and prove the convergence of each equilibrium path to one of the
steady-state equilibrium. Also we look at the relationship between inequality
and output on the set of steady states and find that this relationship is ambigu-
ous. Finally, we deal with an endogenous-growth version of our model, which
displays the ambiguous relationship between inequality and the rate of growth.
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1. Introduction
The understanding of the role of human capital in economic activity has
been decisively spurred by the work of G. Becker (1964). Human capital is a
major feature of economic relations inside the family and, as such, is one of
the key concepts for understanding of the individual decision-making over the
life-cycle and the functioning of labor markets. On their side macroeconomists,
and especially economic growth theorists, investigated the role of human capital
in determining the growth rate of economies in the short and the long run1.
Modern growth theory has long been relying on the fiction of the repre-
sentative agent. However, societies are patently not homogeneous, whether in
incomes, wealth, or many other dimensions. In a sense, the question of inequal-
ity and its link with the growth process is an old one. The classical argument
is that inequality is good for growth because the wealthy are more patient and
accumulate more assets than the poor. Over the last 20 or 30 years, the nexus
between inequality and growth has attracted a great deal of interest. We can
distinguish two types of questions about this nexus. The first one is: “How does
inequality affect growth?”, namely do unequal economies perform better than
those more equal? The policy implications of this first type of question are rele-
vant for policies aiming at redistributing income and wealth among households.
The role played by capital market imperfection in discouraging human capital
accumulation has been stressed by several important contributions (see, e.g.,
Loury (1981), Galor and Zeira (1993))2.
The second type of question about the inequality-growth nexus is then the
following: “How does the growth process affect in turn inequality?”, namely
1To mention but one major contribution, see, e.g., Lucas (1988).
2Other arguments have been put forward to emphasize the negative relationship between
inequality and growth: political economy arguments (Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Bertola
(1993), Persson and Tabellini (1994)), or social conflict arguments (Alesina and Perotti (1996)
and Borissov and Lambrecht (2009)).
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what is the feedback of growth into the evolution of inequality across time.
This second question is relevant also for the first one. Indeed, as Aghion et
al. (1999) argue, if redistribution creates a virtuous circle by alleviating credit
constraints to human capital accumulation, these policy efforts might be vain if
growth in turn worsen inequalities. A virtuous circle would be more or less offset
by a vicious circle. This paper is mainly about the second type of question.
It deals with it by introducing heterogeneity coming from the functioning
of the labor markets, namely the occupational heterogeneity. According to this
heterogneneity, workers in the economy need to occupy positions of different
skill levels and get different endogenously determined wages. As a consequence,
educational decisions determine not only the individual stock of human capital
but also influences the choice of occupation and the wages structure.
Ray (2006) examines equilibrium paths of an economy in which skilled and
unskilled labor are necessary to produce. Each generation decides whether to
finance the offspring’s acquisition of human capital out of a dynastic (Barro,
1974) altruistic motive to finance educational expenses. Since both skilled and
unskilled categories of labor are necessary to production, equilibrium wages
adjust to insure that each category of labor has positive supply, i.e. that one
share of the population occupies low-skill jobs and the other high-skill jobs.
As a result, inequality inside each generation must emerge. Ray (2006) shows
that this intragenerational inequality is persistent in the long run. Moreover a
continuum of steady states is possible.
In a recent contribution, Mookherjee and Ray (forthcoming) extend and
modify Ray’s (2006) model. They provide a small-open economy model with
physical capital, a continuum of occupations, training costs and a mix of utility-
based and wealth-based motivation for bequest. They derive conditions under
which the steady state exhibits inequality. These conditions rely on the share
of occupations with high training costs3 being non degenerate.
Our article is close to Ray’s (2006) and Mookherjee and Ray’s (forthcom-
3Higher than an endogenous threshold.
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ing) articles in the sense that it looks at the persistence of inequality in an
economy populated with altruists facing occupational heterogeneity. Its main
contribution is that it explicitly deploys and analyses the dynamics of human
capital accumulation, and hence allows for different levels of human capital for
the skilled workers.
We assume that individuals care about their offspring’s net disposable in-
come and that there is an accumulative education function. Becker and Tomes
(1979) used this set of hypotheses to analyse the equilibrium distribution of
income and intergenerational mobility. They labeled the approach based on the
offspring’s wealth by the term “quality of the children”. They claimed that
the implications in terms of income distribution of this approach are similar
to those of Barro’s (1974) “dynastic altruism” approach, in which altruists care
about their offsring’s utility. Lambrecht et al (2005) and Lambrecht et al (2006)
studied the properties of fiscal policies under this approach, which they label
“family altruism”. They find less clear cut conclusions: pay-as-you-go policies
are neutral but public debt is not. The family altruism approach enables to
study the transitional dynamics of physical and/or human capital4. As an al-
truistic bequest motive, it is also preferable to Andreoni’s (1989) joy-of-giving
or warm-glow motive because the latter is insensitive to the economic situation
of the beneficiaries of transfers.
To summarize, this paper is based on the threefold assumption of (i) family
altruism (ii) accumulative human capital and (iii) the existence of two distinct
occupational choices (high-skil and low-skill jobs). Moreover, in the high-skill
occupations, there is room for heterogeneity in human capital, and hence in
income. In that sense it combines (i) the neoclassical approach which sees
human capital as efficiency units of labor whose individual endowments vary
across the skilled workers and (ii) the approach which emphasizes the role of
indivisibilities in occupational choice5.
4We confine our analysis to human capital only.
5Indivisibilities may also come from the educational system like in Chusseau and Hellier
(2010).
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We study the equilibrium paths along which human capital is accumulated
differently across each generation’s family. The main results are the follow-
ing. First, we prove that there exists a unique intertemporal equilibrium path
starting from any initial distribution of human capital. Secondly, we establish
necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of stationary equilibrium
paths compatible with inequality in income among families and show that there
exist a multiplicity of steady states. At these steady states, one share of the pop-
ulation permanently supply unskilled labor while the remaining share maintain
a unique and constant human capital across generations and supplies skilled
labor. Then we show that any equilibrium path converges to a steady state
equilibrium with inequality. Finally, we propose an endogenous version of the
model by assuming that the productivity of unskilled labor benefits from the
accumulation of human capital. In this version of the model, it is shown that
the relationship between inequality and growth is ambiguous.
The paper starts with the presentation of the model in Section 2. Then
the competitive equilibrium is analyzed in Section 3. Section 4 studies steady
state equilibria and Section 5 establishes the convergence to equilibrium paths
to steady state equilibrium. In Section 6 we shortly describe an endogenous-
growth version of our model. Section 7 concludes.
2. The model
2.1. The firms
At each time t, the output of the representative firm, Yt, is determined by
the Cobb-Douglas production function:
Yt = (Ht)
α(Lt)
1−α,
where Ht is the supply of human capital and Lt is the supply of unskilled
labor. The wage rates of unskilled labor and human capital, wLt and w
H
t , are
determined by their marginal products:
wHt = α
(
Lt
Ht
)1−α
, wLt = (1− α)
(
Ht
Lt
)α
.
Output is is either consumed or spent on education.
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2.2. The households
Our model is one of successive generations. Each agent lives for one time
period and has one offspring. The set of dynasties is the interval [0, 1]. Each
dynasty is denoted by the variable i. Each agent is endowed with one unit
of unskilled labor force that requires no higher education. Some agents (not
necessarily all) are also endowed with some amount of human capital. We will
call agents with positive endowment of human capital educated agents and those
with zero endowment of human capital uneducated agents.
The human capital of the agent of dynasty i living at time t, ht(i), depends
on the human capital of his parent, ht−1(i) and the amount of money the parent
spent for his higher education, et−1(i). We assume that this dependence is as
follows:
ht(i) = et−1(i)
κ(ht−1(i) + 1)
1−κ, 0 < κ < 1, ∀t ≥ 0. (1)
It follows that if the parent of an individual spent nothing on his education, the
human capital of this individual is nil.
Consider the individual that belongs to dynasty i and lives in period t.
During this period, he supplies inelastically either unskilled labor or human
capital. If wLt > w
H
t ht(i), he supply one unit of unskilled labor. If w
L
t <
wHt ht(i), he supplies ht(i) units of human capital. If w
L
t = w
H
t ht(i), he is
indifferent in this respect. Thus, his total income is
ωt(i) = max{w
L
t , w
H
t ht(i)}, ∀t ≥ 0.
It is divides between consumption ct(i) and education expenditure for his
offspring et(i). This education expenditure is motivated by family altruism
(see Lambrecht et al. 2005 and Lambrecht et al. 2006), i.e. by the concern
for the offspring’s total income ωt+1(i) = max{w
L
t+1, w
H
t+1ht+1(i)}, where w
L
t+1
and wHt+1 are the expected time t + 1 wage rates and ht+1(i) is the offspring’s
human capital. According to (1) at time t+1, spending et(i) on the offspring’s
education determines the latter’s human capital, and thus his total income.
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The individuals’ preferences are defined over consumption ct(i) and the off-
spring’s expected total income ωt+1(i) = max{w
L
t+1, w
H
t+1ht(i)} They are rep-
resented by the following log-linear utility function: ln ct(i) + lnωt+1(i). Hence
the individual maximizes his utility function under his budget constraints con-
sidering current wages and expectations on next period wages as given. We
state this problem as follows
max
ct(i)≥0,et(i)≥0
ln ct(i) + lnωt+1(i)
under the following constraints:
et(i) + ct(i) = ωt(i),
ωt+1(i) = max{w
L
t+1, w
H
t+1ht+1(i)},
ht+1(i) = et(i)
κ(ht(i) + 1)
1−κ.
This problem can be rewritten as follows:
max
0≤et(i)≤ωt(i)
ln(ωt(i)− et(i)) + ln(max{w
L
t+1, w
H
t+1et(i)
κ(ht(i) + 1)
1−κ}). (2)
Problem (2) can be solved in two steps. First we solve the two sub-problems
defined by the two alternatives of the max function,
max
0≤et(i)≤ωt(i)
ln(ωt(i)− et(i)) + ln(w
L
t+1), (3)
and
max
0≤et(i)≤ωt(i)
ln(ωt(i)− et(i)) + ln(w
H
t+1et(i)
κ(ht(i) + 1)
1−κ), (4)
and then we select the solution leading to the highest utility.
The solution to problem (3) is et(i) = 0. If at time t+ 1 dynasty i is going
to supply unskilled labor on the labor market, then at time t its expenditure on
education is nil and all income ωt(i) is spent on consumption. Hence the human
capital of this dynasty at time t + 1, ht+1(i), is also nil. The value of problem
(3) is
V L
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
:= lnωt(i) + lnw
L
t+1.
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The solution to problem (4) is
et(i) = eˆ
H
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
:=
κ
1 + κ
ωt(i).
If at time t+1 dynasty i is going to supply human capital on the labor market,
then at time t its expenditure on education is equal to the fraction κ1+κ of its
income ωt(i). The rest of the income,
1
1+κωt(i), is spent on consumption. Thus,
the endowment of human capital of agent that belongs to dynast i and lives at
time t+ 1 is equal to
hˆH
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
:= γ
(
ωt(i)
)κ(
1 + ht(i)
)1−κ
, (5)
where
γ =
(
κ
1 + κ
)κ
.
The value of problem (4) is
V H
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
:= lnωt(i)− ln(1 + κ) + lnw
H
t+1 + ln hˆ
H
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
.
It is clear that if V H
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
< V L
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
, then the unique
solution to problem (2) coincides with the solution to problem (3). If
V H
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
> V L
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
, then the unique solution to problem
(2) coincides with the solution to problem (4), and if V H
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
=
V L
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
, then the solutions of both (3) and (2) are solutions to (2).
It is easily checked that
V H
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
T V L
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
⇔
hˆH
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
1 + κ
T w
L
t+1
wHt+1
.
Thus we can formulate the following proposition.
Proposition 1. 1) If
hˆH
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
1 + κ
>
wLt+1
wHt+1
, (6)
then et(i) = eˆ
H
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
is the unique solution to (2);
2) if
hˆH
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
1 + κ
<
wLt+1
wHt+1
, (7)
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then et(i) = 0 is the unique solution to (2);
3) if
hˆH
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
1 + κ
=
wLt+1
wHt+1
, (8)
then there are two solutions to (2): et(i) = 0 and et(i) = eˆ
H
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
.
At each time t it is convenient to order the set of dynasties in a way such
that the function ht(·) defined on the interval [0, 1] and describing the distribu-
tion of human capital across dynasties is non-decreasing. At the same time it
follows from (5) that if for some i and j, ht(i) ≥ ht(j) and ωt(i) ≥ ωt(j), then
hˆH
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
≥ hˆH
(
ωt(j), ht(j)
)
. This give us the opportunity to order the
set of dynasties at time 0 and restrict our consideration to paths of the economy
such that all functions ht(·) are non-decreasing at the initial order.
3. Competitive equilibrium
To study the general equilibrium of this economy we proceed in two steps6.
We first study the time t temporary equilibrium in subsection 3.1 given past
variables and expectations of the future. In subsection 3.2, we then describe
the intertemporal equilibrium with perfect foresight as a sequence of temporary
equilibria with some adequate initial conditions and rule for expectations.
3.1. Time t temporary equilibrium
To define the time t temporary equilibrium, we consider all past variables
and expectations of the future as given. The latter are expectations of the next
period wages wLt+1 and w
H
t+1 and the former are the time t − 1 human capital
levels, ht−1(i) ∀i ∈ [0, 1], total incomes ωt−1(i) = max{w
L
t−1, w
H
t−1ht−1(i)} ∀i ∈
[0, 1], and educational spendings et−1(i) ∀i ∈ [0, 1]. Since these given past
variables determine time t human capital levels ht(i) ∀i ∈ [0, 1], we can say that
these levels are completely pre-determined by time t− 1 decisions. To be more
6See Hicks (1939) or, more recently Grandmont (1983) for the articulation of these two
steps.
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precise, all we need to know to construct the time t temporary equilibrium is
the function ht(·).
Let us assume that the function ht(·) is non-decreasing and upper semi-
continuous and that
∫ 1
0
ht(i)di > 0.
A time t temporary equilibrium is defined by a quadruple of functions
{ωt(·), ct(·), et(·), ht+1(·)}, defined on [0, 1], a pair of prices {w
L
t , w
H
t }, a triplet
of aggregate variables {Lt, Ht, Yt} and a pivotal dynasty i
H
t satisfying the fol-
lowing requirements:
• all agents, households and firms, are at their optima;
• the set of dynasties supplying unskilled labor at time t is [0, iHt ) = {i |
0 ≤ i < iHt } and the set of dynasties supplying human capital is [i
H
t , 1] =
{i | iHt ≤ i ≤ 1};
• all markets clear.
It should be noticed that the pivotal dynasty iHt shows the fraction of un-
skilled labor suppliers in the population. The fraction of human capital suppliers
is respectively 1− iHt .
To make our presentation simple we also impose the following requirement
on temporary equilibrium, which will not lead to any loss of generality:
• ht+1(i) is a non-decreasing upper semi-continuous function defined on
[0, 1].
We determine this equilibrium at time t by writing the variables of the
above-mentioned tuples as functions of past variables and expectations. To
find a temporary equilibrium at time t it is sufficient to determine the pivotal
dynasty iHt . Knowing it, one can easily determine the equilibrium values of all
other variables.
In equilibrium, the supply of unskilled labor is equal to
Lt =
∫ iH
t
0
di = iHt , (9)
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the supply of human capital is equal to
Ht =
∫ 1
iH
t
ht(i)di (10)
and human capital and unskilled labor are paid at their marginal products:
wHt = α

 iHt∫ 1
iH
t
ht(i)di


1−α
, wLt = (1− α)


∫ 1
iH
t
ht(i)di
iHt


α
. (11)
Therefore,
wLt
wHt
=
(1− α)
α


∫ 1
iH
t
ht(i)di
iHt

 .
Also, in equilibrium, we need to have
wHt ht(i) ≤ w
L
t ⇔ ht(i) ≤
wLt
wHt
, 0 ≤ i < iHt ,
and
wHt ht(i) ≥ w
L
t ⇔ ht(i) ≥
wLt
wHt
, iHt ≤ i ≤ 1.
Therefore, given the time t human capital levels ht(i)∀ i ∈ [0, 1], the time t
equilibrium pivotal dynasty, iHt , is determined by the following conditions:
ht(i) ≤
(1− α)
α


∫ 1
iH
t
ht(i)di
iHt

 , 0 ≤ i < iHt , (12)
ht(i) ≥
(1− α)
α


∫ 1
iH
t
ht(i)di
iHt

 , iHt ≤ i ≤ 1. (13)
It is clear that (1−α)α
( ∫ 1
iH
ht(i)di
iH
)
is a continuous decreasing function of iH .
At the same time ht(i) is a non-decreasing function of i. Therefore, to find the
pivotal dynasty it is sufficient to ”solve” the following equation in iH :
ht(i
H) =
(1− α)
α
(∫ 1
iH
ht(i)di
iH
)
. (14)
If the solution to equation (14) exists, the time t equilibrium pivotal dynasty
coincides with this solution. In this case this dynasty is the one with human
capital just equal to the ratio between unskilled labor wage rate and human
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capital wage rate and hence for this dynasty supplying unskilled labor will result
in the same income as supplying human capital:
wLt = w
H
t ht(i
H
t ).
A solution to (14) may not exist because ht(i) is not necessarily continuous.
But even in the case of non-existence there is a unique iHt satisfying (12)-(13).
Knowing iHt , we get Ht, Lt, w
H
t and w
L
t from (9)–(11). Also we are able to
determine the total income of all households:
ωt(i) =

 w
L
t , 0 ≤ i < i
H
t ,
wHt ht(i), i
H
t ≤ i ≤ 1.
With the pairs {ht(i), ωt(i)} ∀i, we can now determine the time t equilibrium
educational expenditures, et(i), i.e. the optimal educational expenditures at
equilibrium prices given expectations on next period wage rates wLt+1 and w
H
t+1.
Once this variable is determined, it will give us the next period distribution
of human capital, the ht+1(i)’s. Here we should notice that the functions et(·)
and ht+1(·) are not necessarily uniquely determined, because for i satisfying
(8), et(i) is equal to either 0 or eˆ
H
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
. However, this non-uniqueness
plays no role in our model, because, as will be shown in the next subsection, in
intertemporal equilibrium non-uniqueness does not appear.
For short, in what follows we identify any temporary equilibrium at time t
with the couple {iHt , ht+1(·)}.
3.2. The intertemporal equilibrium with perfect foresight
Suppose we are given an initial state of the economy represented by a non-
decreasing upper semi-continuous function h0(·) showing the distribution of hu-
man capital across dynasties at the initial time. We assume that
∫ 1
0
h0(i)di > 0
and define an intertemporal equilibrium path {iHt , ht+1(·)}
∞
t=0 starting from h0(·)
as a sequence of temporary equilibria, such that at each time t each dynasty
has perfect foresight, that is, correctly anticipate time t+ 1 wage rates.
Theorem 1. For any initial state h0(·) there is a unique intertemporal equilib-
rium path starting from this initial state.
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Proof. Let ht(·) be given. Let further i
H
t , w
L
t , w
H
t and ωt(·) be found as
described in the previous section. To find the function ht+1(·), we start with
using the time t+1 human capital function associated with positive investment
in education given by equation (5) in section 2.2, namely hˆH
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
. Since
the analysis will focus on the pivotal dynasty and all the arguments of this
function depend on i, we re-write it as a function h˜t+1 of i.
Namely, let the function h˜t+1 : [0, 1]→ R+ be defined by
h˜t+1(i) = hˆ
H
(
ωt(i), ht(i)
)
(= γ [ωt(i)]
κ (
1 + ht(i)
)1−κ
).
Clearly, h˜t+1(·) is a non-decreasing upper semi-continuous function such that
h˜t+1(i) = γ
[
wLt
]κ
, 0 ≤ i < iHt , (15)
h˜t+1(i) = γ
[
wHt
]κ
ψ(ht(i)), i
H
t ≤ i ≤ 1, (16)
where the function ψ : R+ → R+ is given by
ψ(h) = hκ(h+ 1)1−κ.
Let further the function Ht+1 : [0, 1]→ R+ be defined by
Ht+1(i
H) =
∫ 1
iH
h˜t+1(i)di. (17)
This function is continuous and decreasing. It shows the dependence of the
aggregate supply of human capital on the pivotal dynasty. In equilibrium at
time t + 1 the ratio of the wage rates of common labor and human capital is
endogenously determined by the marginal productivities of these inputs, which
in turn is determined by the relative masses of these inputs. So we have:
1− α
α
Ht+1(i
H
t+1)
iHt+1
=
wLt+1
wHt+1
and, at the same time, from Proposition 1 and the definition of the function
h˜t+1(·)
h˜t+1(i)
1 + κ
≤
wLt+1
wHt+1
, 0 ≤ i < iHt+1, (18)
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h˜t+1(i)
1 + κ
≥
wLt+1
wHt+1
, iHt+1 ≤ i ≤ 1. (19)
Whereas Ht+1(i
H)
iH
is a decreasing function of iH , h˜t+1(i) is a non-decreasing
function. Moreover,
1− α
α
Ht+1(i
H)
iH
>
h˜t+1(i
H)
1 + κ
for sufficiently small iH > 0 and
1− α
α
Ht+1(i
H)
iH
<
h˜t+1(i
H)
1 + κ
for iH sufficiently close to 1.
To find the time t + 1 equilibrium pivotal dynasty iHt+1, it is sufficient to
”solve” the following equation in iH :
1− α
α
Ht+1(i
H)
iH
=
h˜t+1(i
H)
1 + κ
(20)
If this equation has a solution, it is unique. Since h˜t+1(·) may be discontinuous,
the non-existence of a solution to equation (20) is possible. But even if (20) has
no solution, there exists a unique iHt+1 satisfying the following conditions:
1− α
α
Ht+1(i)
i
>
h˜t+1(i)
1 + κ
, 0 ≤ i < iHt+1,
1− α
α
Ht+1(i)
i
≤
h˜t+1(i)
1 + κ
, iHt+1 ≤ i ≤ 1.
This iHt+1 is the required time t+ 1 equilibrium pivotal dynasty
As for ht+1(·), it is determined as follows:
ht+1(i) = 0, 0 ≤ i < i
H
t+1,
ht+1(i) = h˜t+1(i), i
H
t+1 ≤ i ≤ 1. 
It should be noticed that, unlike temporary equilibrium, non-uniqueness of
equilibria does no appear in intertemporal equilibrium. This is because in the
definition of temporary equilibrium at time t agents take the wage rates at
time t + 1 as given, whereas in intertemporal equilibrium they are determined
endogenously. Also it is noteworthy that in intertemporal equilibrium an agent
spend a positive fraction of his income on education if and only if his offspring
will be human capital supplier on the labor market.
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4. Steady-state equilibria
We now turn to the examination of steady-state equilibria. They are charac-
terized by the feature that the wage rates and the fractions of educated agents
supplying human capital on the labor market and uneducated agents supplying
unskilled labor are constant over time and that inside each dynasty children find
themselves in the same position as their parents.
At a steady-state equilibrium, the amount of human capital h∗ supplied by
agents from an educated dynasty depends only on the wage paid to one unit
of human capital, wH∗, because h∗ is the solution to the following equation:
h = γ(wH∗)κψ(h). Hence, at a steady-state equilibrium all educated dynasties
supply the same amount of it. Therefore we can define steady-state equilibria
as follows.
A couple (iH∗, h∗), iH∗ ∈ (0, 1), h∗ > 0, is called a steady-state equilibrium
if the sequence {it, ht+1(·)}
∞
t=0 given by
it = i
H∗, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,
ht+1(i) = 0, 0 ≤ i < i
H∗, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,
ht+1(i) = h
∗, iH∗ ≤ i ≤ 1, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,
is an equilibrium path starting from h0(·) defined as follows:
h0(i) = 0, 0 ≤ i < i
H∗,
h0(i) = h
∗, iH∗ ≤ i ≤ 1.
It follows from (10) and (11) that at any steady state equilibrium (iH∗, h∗)
the total supply of human capital, H∗ and the wage rates of unskilled labor and
human capital, wL∗ and wH∗, are given as follows:
H∗ = (1− iH∗)h∗,
wH∗ = α
(
iH∗
H∗
)1−α
= α
(
iH∗
(1− iH∗)h∗
)1−α
, (21)
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wL∗ = (1− α)
(
H∗
iH∗
)α
= (1− α)
(
(1− iH∗)h∗
iH∗
)α
. (22)
We are more precisely interested in the ratio of unskilled labor wage to
human capital wage:
wL∗
wH∗
=
1− α
α
(1− iH∗)h∗
iH∗
, (23)
which is a decreasing function of iH∗ and an increasing function of h∗. Also we
are interested in the skill premium P ∗, which is a reasonable measure of income
inequality at a steady-state (iH∗, h∗) equilibrium of our model. It is defined as
the proportion of the wage earned by an educated individual to the wage of an
unskilled individual:
P ∗ :=
wH∗h∗
wL∗
.
It follows from (23) that on the set of steady-state equilibria the skill premium
can be considered as an increasing function of iH∗:
P ∗ =
α
1− α
iH∗
1− iH∗
.
Let (iH∗, h∗) be a steady-state equilibrium and {it, ht+1(·)}
∞
t=0 be the cor-
responding equilibrium path. It follows from (15)-(16) that for this path,
h˜t+1(i) =

 γ(w
L∗)κ, 0 ≤ i < iH∗,
γ(wH∗)κψ(h∗), iH∗ ≤ i ≤ 1.
Therefore (18) and (19) can be rewritten as respectively
γ(wL∗)κ
1 + κ
≤
wL∗
wH∗
(24)
and
γ(wH∗)κψ(h∗)
1 + κ
≥
wL∗
wH∗
. (25)
The first of these inequalities means that the uneducated agents have no incen-
tives to spend money on the education of their offsprings and the second that
the educated agents have such incentives. It is also clear that
h∗ = γ(wH∗)κψ(h∗). (26)
One can easily prove the following proposition.
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Proposition 2. A couple (iH∗, h∗), 0 < iH∗ < 1, h∗ > 0, is a steady-state
equilibrium if and only if for wH∗ and wL∗ given by (21) and (22) respectively,
(24)-(26) hold true.
Let us now describe the relationship between the share of uneducated agents
in the population, iH∗, and the human capital accumulated by an educated
agent in a steady-state equilibrium, h∗. It is reasonable to conjecture that this
relationship is increasing because a higher fraction of uneducated agents can
lead to a larger skill premium and wages of educated individuals and hence to
higher individual educational expenditures. The following lemma says that this
conjecture is true.
Lemma 2. There is a smooth increasing function χ : (0, 1)→ R+ and numbers
L1 and L2, 0 < L2 < L1 ≤ 1, such that for any i
∗ ∈ (0, 1) and for wH∗ and
wL∗ given by (21) and (22) respectively,
(26) is equivalent to
h∗ = χ(iH∗), (27)
(25) is equivalent to iH∗ ≥ L2,
(24) is equivalent to iH∗ ≤ L1.
The proof of this lemma is relegated to Appendix.
The following theorem describing the the structure of steady-state equilibria
follows directly from Proposition 2 and Lemma 2.
Theorem 3. There is a smooth increasing function χ : (0, 1)→ R+ and num-
bers L1 and L2, 0 < L2 < L1 ≤ 1, such that a couple (i
H∗, h∗) is a steady-state
equilibrium if and only if either
L2 ≤ i
H∗ ≤ L1 (if L1 < 1)
or
L2 ≤ i
H∗ < L1 (if L1 = 1)
and
h∗ = χ(iH∗).
Theorem 3 reads that, like in Ray (2006), the set of steady-state equilibria
is a continuum. More precisely, this set is essentially an interval which can be
parameterized by the fraction of uneducated agents in the population.
Another interesting parametrization of the set of steady-state equilibria is
that by the skill premium. This parametrization can help us to explain why
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all equilibrium values of the fraction of uneducated agents lies in the interval
[L2, L1]. If i
H∗ < L2, then the couple (i
H∗, χ(iH∗) is not a steady-state equilib-
rium because the wage rate of unskilled labor is so high and the skill premium is
so small that even the educated parents have no incentives to spend a positive
fraction of their incomes on the education of their children. If L2 ≤ i
H∗ ≤ L1,
then the skill premium is such that the educated individuals prefer to see their
children educated while the uneducated agents find it too expensive to spend
money on the education of their children. Finally, if iH∗ > L1, the couple
(iH∗, χ(iH∗) is not a steady-state equilibrium because the wage rate of unskilled
labor is so small and the skill premium is so high that even the uneducated
individuals are ready to spend money on the education of their children.
Let us now consider the question of what is the relationship between in-
equality, measured by the skill premium, and output on the set of steady-state
equilibria. To sketch the broad outlines of this relationship, it is sufficient to
look at the dependence of output on iH∗, because the skill premium P ∗ is an
increasing function of iH∗. The level of output, Y ∗, corresponding to a steady-
state equilibrium (iH∗, χ(iH∗)) is
Y ∗ = [(1− iH∗)χ(iH∗)]α[iH∗]1−α.
It would be difficult to derive an analytical form of the function [(1 −
i)χ(i)]α[i]1−α. The shape of the graph of this function depends on the pa-
rameters of the model, α and κ. However, it is clear that the dependence of
Y ∗ on iH∗ is quite ambiguous. Our computational experiments show that this
dependence on the interval [L2, L1] can be of an inverted U-shaped form or
increasing.
On Fig. 1 we present L1, L2 and the graph of [(1 − i)χ(i)]
α[i]1−α on the
segment [0, 1] at α = 0.4, κ = 0.5. On [L2, L1] the function [(1− i)χ(i)]
α[i]1−α
has an inverted U-shaped form.
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Figure 1.
On Fig. 2 we present L1, L2 and the graph of Γ(i) on the segment [0, 1] at
α = 0.3, κ = 0.96. On [L2, L1] the function [(1− i)χ(i)]
α[i]1−α increasing.
Figure 2.
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5. Convergence of equilibrium paths
The following theorem reads that any equilibrium path converge to a steady-
state equilibrium and that the number of uneducated agents does not increase
in time (except, perhaps, at time t = 1).
Theorem 4. For any equilibrium path {iHt , ht+1(·)}
∞
t=0 the sequence {i
H
t }
∞
t=1 is
non-increasing (it may be that iH1 > i
H
0 ) and there is a steady-state equilibrium
(iH∗, h∗) such that
iHt −→t→∞ i
H∗,
ht(i) −→t→∞ h
∗, iHt ≤ i ≤ 1.
Proof. It is sufficient to prove that for any equilibrium path {iHt , ht+1(·)}
∞
t=0
the sequence {iHt }
∞
t=1 is non-increasing (it may be that i
H
1 > i
H
0 ).
Let {iHt , ht+1(·)}
∞
t=0 be an equilibrium path. Show that for any t = 1, 2, . . .,
iHt+1 ≤ i
H
t .
We have
h˜t+1(i) = γ
(
wHt
)κ
ψ(ht(i)), i
H
t ≤ i ≤ 1.
Therefore,
Ht+1(i
H
t ) = γ
(
wHt
)κ ∫ 1
iH
t
ψ(ht(i))di,
where Ht+1(·) is defined by (17).
It is clear that ψ(h)h decreases as h > 0 increases and hence
ψ[ht(i)]
ht(i)
≤
ψ[ht(i
H
t )]
ht(iHt )
, iHt ≤ i ≤ 1.
It follows that
ψ[ht(i)] ≤
ψ[ht(i
H
t )]
ht(iHt )
ht(i), i
H
t ≤ i ≤ 1.
Therefore,
Ht+1(i
H
t ) ≤ γ
(
wHt
)κ ψ[ht(iHt )]
ht(iHt )
∫ 1
iH
t
ht(i)di = h˜t+1(i
H
t )
Ht(i
H
t )
ht(iHt )
.
Thus,
Ht+1(i
H
t )
h˜t+1(iHt )
≤
Ht(i
H
t )
ht(iHt )
,
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which implies iHt+1 ≤ i
H
t .
To complete the proof, it is sufficient to note that the sequence {iHt }
∞
t=1
is bounded from below and therefore converges to some iH∗. It is no difficult
to check that iH∗ > 0 and the required steady-state equilibrium is the couple
(iH∗, h∗), where h∗ = χ(iH∗). 
6. Endogenous growth
In this section we propose an endogenous growth version of our model. To
do this, we introduce an endogenously formed variable reflecting the state of
technology at time t, At. An increase in its value leads (i) to a higher effective-
ness of unskilled labor and (ii) promote accumulation of human capital. In its
turn, the accumulation of human capital contribute to the growth of the value
of this variable through a macroeconomic externality.
More precisely, our assumptions are as follows. The output at time t, Yt, is
given by
Yt = H
α
t (AtLt)
1−α.
Therefore the wage earned by each agent supplying unskilled labor on the labor
market is wLt = (1− α)H
α
t (AtLt)
1−α.
The human capital of an agent of dynasty i at time t, ht(i), depends not only
on the human capital of his parent, ht−1(i) and the amount of money the parent
spent for his higher education, et−1(i), but also on the state of technology at
time t− 1, At−1:
ht(i) = et−1(i)
κ(ht−1(i) +At−1)
1−κ, 0 < κ < 1. (28)
As for the formation of At, we assume that
At = Φ(Ht−1, At−1),
where Φ : R2+ → R is a continuous homogeneous of degree one concave function.
Thus, the variable At i) shows the efficiency of unskilled labor and ii) plays
the role of an input in the educational production function. Its value can grow
over time through the accumulation of human capital.
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The behavior of individuals is the same as in the case of the exogenous growth
model with the only difference that (1) is replaced by (28). The temporal and
intertemporal equilibria are also defined in practically the same way as above.
The difference is that a temporal equilibrium at each time t is described not by
a couple {iHt , ht+1(·)}, but by a triple {i
H
t , At+1, ht+1(·)} satisfying the require-
ments formulated in Subsection 3.1 and the equation At+1 = Φ(
∫ 1
0
ht(i)di, At).
Clearly, an initial state of an intertemporal equilibrium path is determined by a
couple {A0, h0(·)}. The existence of an intertemporal equilibrium paths is also
proved in the same way.
As for a steady-state equilibrium, it is defined as a triple {iH∗, 1 + g∗, h∗},
iH∗ ∈ (0, 1), h∗ > 0, such that the sequence {it, At+1, ht+1(·)}
∞
t=0 given by
it = i
H∗, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,
At = (1 + g
∗)t, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,
ht+1(i) = 0, 0 ≤ i < i
H∗, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,
ht+1(i) = At+1h
∗, iH∗ ≤ i ≤ 1, t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,
is an equilibrium path starting from the initial state {A0, h0(·)} given by A0 = 1,
h0(i) = 0, 0 ≤ i < i
H∗,
h0(i) = h
∗, iH∗ ≤ i ≤ 1.
As in the case of exogenous growth, it is not difficult to show that any
equilibrium path converges to a steady-state equilibrium. The structure of the
set of steady-state equilibria is described in the following theorem.
Theorem 5. There is a smooth increasing function χ : (0, 1)→ R+ and num-
bers L1 and L2, 0 < L2 < L1 ≤ 1, such that a triple (i
H∗, 1 + g∗, h∗) is a
steady-state equilibrium if and only if either
L2 ≤ i
H∗ ≤ L1 (if L1 < 1)
or
L2 ≤ i
H∗ < L1 (if L1 = 1)
and
h∗ = χ(iH∗), 1 + g∗ = Φ((1− iH∗)h∗, 1)
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What does the endogenous growth version of our model tell about the nexus
of income inequality and the rate of economic growth? The debate on this is-
sue is not settled. The classical approach suggests that inequality stimulates
capital accumulation and thus promotes economic growth, whereas the mod-
ern approach argues in contrast that for sufficiently wealthy economies equal-
ity stimulates investment in human capital and hence may enhance economic
growth.
In our model, the nature of the relationship between income inequality and
the rate of growth on the set of steady-state equilibria can be illustrated by the
graph of the dependence of (1 − iH∗)χ(iH∗) on iH∗ because, on the one hand,
the rate of growth is an increasing function of (1− iH∗)χ(iH∗) and, on the other
hand, the skill gap P ∗ increases with an increase in iH∗. Our simulations show
that this dependence of (1 − iH∗)χ(iH∗) on iH∗ on the interval [L2, L1] can
increasing (α = 0.4,κ = 0.99) or decreasing (α = 0.2,κ = 0.3) or of an inverted
U-shaped form (α = 0.8,κ = 0.9).
In our model, the nature of the relationship between income inequality and
the rate of growth on the set of steady-state equilibria can be illustrated by the
graph of the dependence of (1 − iH∗)χ(iH∗) on iH∗ because, on the one hand,
the rate of growth is an increasing function of (1− iH∗)χ(iH∗) and, on the other
hand, the skill gap P ∗ increases with an increase in iH∗. Our computational
experiments show that this dependence of (1−iH∗)χ(iH∗) on iH∗ on the interval
[L2, L1] can be increasing, decreasing or of an inverted U-shaped form.
On Figs. 3-5 we present graphs of (1 − i)χ(i) on the segment [0, 1] and
indicate L2 and L1 for different values of parameters α and κ.
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Figure 3. α = 0.4, κ = 0.5.
Figure 4. α = 0.7, κ = 0.8.
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Figure 5. α = 0.3, κ = 0.96.
7. Conclusion
To answer the question of how the growth process affects inequality, namely
the question of the feedback of growth into the evolution of inequality across
time, we developed a model characterized both by (i) capital accumulation,
out of a family altruism motive, and (ii) a twofold occupational choice between
skilled and unskilled position.
We showed how the initial wage distribution evolves across time. The piv-
otal dynasty splitting the population in two classes evolves in the direction of
including more and more families in the skilled-labor class. However in the
long run, wage inequality and the division of population between skilled and
unskilled remains.
The steady state equilibrium itself is actually a continuum and for each of
these steady state a different wage inequality and splitting prevails. We show
that the relationship between the location of the steady state pivotal dynasty,
and hence the long run wage inequality, and the level of output (or the rate of
growth of output) is ambiguous.
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Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 2
To describe the set of steady-state equilibria we verify two things. First
we show that on the set of steady-state equilibria there is a monotonically de-
creasing relationship between the equilibrium pivotal dynasty iH∗, which shows
the fraction of uneducated agents in the population, and the amount of human
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capital, h∗, supplied by each educated agent. Second, we show that the set of
equilibrium values of iH is an interval.
Let us first prove the following lemma.
Lemma 6. 1) There is a smooth increasing function χ : (0, 1)→ R+ such that
for any i ∈ (0, 1),
h = γ
[
α
(
i
(1− i)h
)1−α]κ
ψ(h)⇔ h = χ(i). (A.1)
This function satisfies
χ(i)→ 0 as i→ 0 and χ(i)→∞ as i→ 1. (A.2)
2) 1−ii χ(i) monotonically decreases from ∞ to (γα
κ)
1
(1−α)κ as i increases from
0 to 1.
Proof. 1) Given that ψ(h) = hκ(h+1)1−κ, we can rewrite the first equation
in (A.1) as
h = γακ
(
i
1− i
)(1−α)κ
hακ(h+ 1)1−κ,
or, after dividing both sides by hακ(h+ 1)1−κ, as
h1−ακ
(h+ 1)1−κ
= γακ
(
i
1− i
)(1−α)κ
. (A.3)
The LHS of the last equation is continuous and increasing in h, tends to 0 as
h → 0 and to +∞ as h tends to +∞ since 1 − ακ > 1 − κ. The RHS of this
equation is continuous and increasing in i, tends to 0 as i → 0 and to +∞ as
i → 1. It is then obvious that for any i there exists a solution to (A.3) in h.
To complete the proof, denote this solution by χ(i) and notice that the both
properties in (A.2) hold true.
2) After some rearrangement of (A.3) we can get
1− i
i
χ(i) = (γακ)
1
(1−α)κ
(
1 +
1
χ(i)
)(1−κ)/(1−α)κ
.
Since χ(i) monotonically increases from 0 to ∞ , 1−ii χ(i) monotonically de-
creases from ∞ to (γακ)
1
(1−α)κ as i increases from 0 to 1. 
Because of (21) and Lemma 6, equation (26) can be rewritten as (27), where
χ(·) is the function introduced in Lemma 6. Thus, the amount of human capital
28
supplied by each educated agent is an increasing function of the fraction of
uneducated agents in the population.
Also, by (23) and (26), we can rewrite (25) as
h∗
1 + κ
≥
1− α
α
(1− iH∗)h∗
iH∗
,
or, equivalently, as
iH∗ ≥ L2 :=
(1− α)(1 + κ)
(1− α)(1 + κ) + α
.
Let us now rewrite (24) as
γ
1 + κ
(1− α)κ
(
(1− iH∗)h∗
iH∗
)ακ
≤
1− α
α
(1− iH∗)h∗
iH∗
,
This inequality can be re-written as
γ
1 + κ
(1− α)κ ≤
1− α
α
(
1− iH∗
iH∗
h∗
)1−ακ
=
1− α
α
(
1− iH∗
iH∗
χ(iH∗)
)1−ακ
or, after substituting (27) as
γ
1 + κ
(1− α)κ ≤
1− α
α
(
1− iH∗
iH∗
χ(iH∗)
)1−ακ
. (A.4)
By Lemma 6, 1−ii χ(i) monotonically decreases from ∞ to (γα
κ)
1
(1−α)κ as i
increases from 0 to 1. Therefore, if
(
αγ
1 + κ
(1− α)κ−1
) 1
1−ακ
≥ (γακ)
1
(1−α)κ ,
then (A.4) is equivalent to
iH∗ ≤ L1, (A.5)
where L1 is the solution to the following equation in i:
γ
1 + κ
(1− α)κ =
1− α
α
(
1− i
i
χ(i)
)1−ακ
.
If (
αγ
1 + κ
(1− α)κ−1
) 1
1−ακ
< (γακ)
1
(1−α)κ ,
then (A.4) holds for all iH∗ ∈ (0, 1).
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To complete the the proof of Lemma 2, it is necessary to show that L2 < L1.
To do this, let
h∗∗ := χ(L2),
wH∗∗ := α
(
L2
(1− L2)h∗∗
)1−α
, wL∗∗ := (1− α)
(
(1− L2)h
∗∗
L2
)α
.
We have
h∗∗
1 + κ
=
γ(wH∗∗)κψ(h∗∗)
1 + κ
=
wL∗∗
wH∗∗
.
It follows that
wH∗∗h∗∗ >
wH∗∗h∗∗
1 + κ
= wL∗∗.
Hence
γ(wL∗∗)κ
1 + κ
<
γ(wH∗∗h∗∗)κ
1 + κ
<
γ(wH∗∗)κ(h∗∗)κ(h∗∗ + 1)1−κ
1 + κ
=
γ(wH∗∗)κψ(h∗∗)
1 + κ
=
wL∗∗
wH∗∗
.
It is clear that (24) fulfills as a strict inequality if and only if (A.5) fulfills as a
strict inequality. Therefore the last chain on inequalities implies L2 < L1. 
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